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EVIDENCE AS A PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATING
EDWARD W. CLEARY*
"Hellish dark, and smells of cheese.'"
The law of evidence is sagging to the point of collapse under its own
weight. It has cracked visibly in the administrative sphere, and what saves
it in the courts is probably a rather general ignorance of what is actually
between the covers of Wigmore, plus the fact that lawyers and judges often
seem to be downright ashamed to push the rules to their logical extremes.
Evidence in action is, happily perhaps, somewhat different from evidence in
books.2 Nevertheless, among people who are thoughtful about such things
there is general agreement that something ought to be done.
Basically two problems are apparent: the multiplicity of the rules and
their unreality. Possibly the unreality is what causes the multiplicity.
In the realm of honest searching after facts, nothing could be further
removed from scientific method than the rules governing procedures used
in courts. Scientific method involves systematic observation, impersonally
conducted under conditions which permit the checking of results by others.
3
The courts and jurists have engaged in no systematic observation.
4  The
adversary approach to facts usually presents a dog fight between two con-
flicting versions out of which the trier is expected to emerge triumphantly
carrying in his teeth the bone of "truth." While synoptic vision may be "a
distinguishing mark of liberal civilization"5 in the formulation of value
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. The servant Pigg thus described the weather when by mistake in the dark he put
his head inside the cupboard instead of out the window. SURTEES, HANDI.EY CROSS;
OR MR. JoRRocxs's HUNT 418 (1930).
This essay was undertaken with acute awareness of the semantic problems which
accompany excursions into strange disciplines. Some omissions are due to oversight
and ignorance; others are, in the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, concessions to the
shortness of human life. Most of the cases cited will be found in the standard case-
books: LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (1949) ; McCORMICK, CASES ON
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1948); MORGAN AND MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1951).
2. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 508 (1938); MA-
GUIRE, EVIDENCE: COat-sON SENSE AND COM.ON LAM, 2-9 (1947). It seems apparent
that local studies made in connection with proposed codes of evidence have required
considerable recourse to the books. See for example, the symposium, MIissouri Evidence
Code, 14 Mo. L. lEv. 251 (1949).
3. MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 8 (2d ed. 1951); MARX, PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 6 (1951)
Mees, Scientific Thought and Social Reconstruction, 53 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 381
(1934).
4. Studying reported decisions is a literary rather than a scientific pursuit. The
magnificent failures of Underhill Moore ought, however, to be mentioned.
5. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 242 (1950).
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judgments, it is a most misleading figure of speech as applied to facts.,
Obviously there is a great difference between the experimental laboratory
and the court room, but the question is whether the difference need be as
great as we make it. Bridgman's notion of operationism, in attempting to
Improve the accuracy of scientific language, insists that concepts be defined
in terms of the operations producing them.- Evidence operates on the
reverse basis that the concept produces the result. Legal water runs uphill.
In science a theory possesses a recognized provisional and tool-like
character. If the empirical data collected do not support the theory, the
theory is discarded. Since the law never collects any empirical data, it is
spared the embarrassment of having ever to discard a theory on that basis.
Admittedly courts cannot be converted into experimental laboratories, yet
inability to produce earthquakes has not precluded the development of seis-
mology scientifically. Naturalistic observation can be both systematic and
scientific.
Most substantive law is concerned with how people should act. It is
filled with oughts and value judgments." Evidence is almost unique in being
primarily concerned with the is. Other than some minor value judgments
concerning such things as privilege, the rules of evidence are constructed
upon certain assumptions as to how people do in fact act under particular
circumstances, rather than how they ought to act. A reference to the chicken
cases makes this clear. If upon being released from the premises of the
accused the chickens march down the road to the chicken house of the com-
plaining witness, climb on the roost and make themselves at home, evidence
of the conduct of the chickens is admissible.9 Everyone knows that chickens
come home to roost. We accept the conduct and do not worry because the
chickens cannot be put under oath or subjected to cross-examination. By
way of contrast, if the victim of a homicide makes a dying declaration, his
statement may be. received in evidence provided certain requisites are met,
although he too, like the chickens, was not under oath or subject to cross-
examination. In the chicken case we rely upon certain well known aspects
of chicken behavior, based upon rather general observation. But no one has
6. The alternative of resorting to the continental method, with adversary participa-
tion and responsibilities subordinated and judicial interposition correspondingly increased,
is less well calculated to maintain the integrity of the individual. Despite the great
elements of strength in the adversary system in this regard, its dealing with facts is
not a strong point.
7. BRImGmAN, THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS (1927).
8. Judge Frank, for one, feels that legal thought has been overly preoccupied with
value judgments and has fallen into serious error by ignoring the moral problem of
defective court-house fact-finding. COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); "Short of Sickncss and
Dealth": A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 545
(1951).
9. State v. Wagner, 207 Iowa 224, 222 N.W. 407, 61 A.L.R. 882 (1928).
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ever systematically or even fairly generally observed whether people con-
fronted with the imminence of death actually do tell the truth. Instead, the
solemnity of the occasion or the approach of a final judgment or some such
thing is assumed to operate upon the declarant so as to elicit only truthful
statements.' 0 Because the judges regard man as a rational animal they have
constructed a pattern of human behavior based upon assumptions as to the
effects of varying factors upon rational beings. Thus the reasonable man
appears as a far more dominating figure in the law of evidence, where his
presence is largely unsuspected, than in the field of negligence, where his
whereabouts is at least known."1 He is the imaginary yardstick by which
are measured the actions of participants and the reactions of triers, the
legal opposite number of the now deceased economic man.'
2
In this fashion the rules of evidence largely have been constructed out
of anecdote and unsystematic observation, plus what hopefully passes for
reason but could more honestly be labelled conjecture about human behavior.
In the main the jurists have been overawed by the powers of their own
minds.' 3  Yet the human brain weighs only about three pounds, and too
much ought not to be expected of it.
If the rules of evidence are that bad, and there are those who think so,
then perhaps the effort to control the judicial decision-making process through
rules of exclusion ought to be abandoned in favor of evolving principles
for evaluating evidence as is the trend in the administrative field, or perhaps
we ought just frankly to get down on all fours like some congressional
investigating committees.
10. The classic exposition is that of Eyre, C.B., in Rex v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500,
168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (C.C. 1789): "Now the general principle on which this species
of evidence is admitted is, that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party
is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive
to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations
to speak the truth: a situation so solemn, and so awful, is considered by the law as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered
in a Court of Justice."
11. Green says the reasonable man in negligence cases is "an objectification of a
major abstraction." JUDGE AND JURY 164 (1930). Even in the chicken case we assume
a reasonable chicken. An unreasonable one might go elsewhere to roost.
12. Spence's comment about such psychological speculations as "mind," "libido,"
"insight" and "instinct" as explanations of behavior applies equally to the reasonable
man notion. "When not safe from disproof by reason of the fact that their locus is
usually specified to be in some region within the organism, inaccessible to observation,
these concepts are rendered invulnerable by failure to specify what relations they might
have either to the S [stimulus] or R [response] variables. While such vagueness renders
them unverifiable, it does insure them a vigorous and long career among certain types
of thinkers." The Nature of Theory Construction in Contemporary Psychology, 51
PsYcH. REv. 47, 52 (1944).
13. Stevens, Psychology and the Science of Science, 36 PsYch. BULL. 221 (1939),
suggests that "the sheep whose wool shone white under the light of reason" were most




Considerable attention has been devoted to the relation between the
exclusionary rules of evidence and the probative value of evidence. Some
observers have professed to see a substantial correlation, others little or
none. 14 Here and there in the rules are found attempts at quantitative or
qualitative evaluations: requiring corroborration of an accomplice; the need
of two witnesses in case of treason; rules as to attesting witnesses; holding
evidence inherently incredible as contrary to judicial notice; and falsus in
ito, once a great favorite but now fallen into disrepute."- Others might be
added, but the picture remains unimpressive. The cases in which courts
of review have purported to pass on the "weight" of the evidence reveal
the hopelessness of any systematic approach to the problem.', If evidence
has weight, it must be mensurable, but no standard of measurement is at
hand-pounds, liters and inches will not work. Talking in terms of trier's
discretion means either that a theory cannot be formulated or else that it
really makes no difference anyway. And to say "It is only convincing, not
lawyers' evidence which is required" merely ducks the whole problem.'
7
Effective control of the decision-making process seems likely to be ac-
complished only in terms of rules of exclusion, and the integrity of the
process demands that the rules be defensible.
As psychology emerged from the caves of mental philosophy and began
to assume scientific stature, those who recognized that the rules of evidence
were largely based upon speculations about human behavior realized that
evidence and psychology had staked out common ground. Unhappily the
new science succumbed to the temptation to furnish immediate answers to
"highly general, practically important but experimentally meaningless ques-
tions."' 8  Miinsterberg,lu and a multitude who followed in his steps,
concentrated on testimonial errors, reaching the conclusion that human
observation was not very dependable. This was both unstartling and without
14. Ladd, The Relationship of Exclusionary Rules to the .Problem of Proof, 18
MINN. L. REv. 506 (1934), perceives a close relationship. McCormick, Tomorrow's
Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507 (1938), is skeptical. James, The Role of Hearsay
in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REv. 788 (1940), and DAvIs, AD UnxisTaA-
TIVE LAw, 448, 474 (1951), in the main disclaim any relationship. While Wigmore in
his ScIENcE OF JUDICIAL PaOOF 924 (3d ed. 1937) saw a close relation between rules
of admissibility and probative value, it is interesting that he felt impelled to write a
book of this title after completing his monumental treatise.
15. Note, 29 NE. L. REv. 122 (1949), contains an interesting criticism of tile
psychological basis of the falsus in uno instruction.
16. Lord, New Trials and Appellate Review, 56 DIcK. L. REv. 88 (1951).
17. Rutledge, J., in International Association v. NLRB, 71 App. D.C. 175, 110 F.2d
29, 35 (1939). See also DAvis, ADIINiSTRATIVE LAw 473 (1951).
18. MARx, PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 12 (1951). "The discouragement of such
questions except in preliminary formulations and long-range goals, and their replacement
or at least supplementation by more specific and productive questions, seem to be a
necessary prerequisite for scientific advance in psychology. The large generalizations
will then follow as factual knowledge and empirically-related theory are built up on
a more solid basis."
19. ON THE WITNESS STAND (1930).
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practical implications for the judicial process. By and large, the psychologists
left the jurists, like Pavlov's dog, with their Mouths watering although no
food was in sight. The lawyers therefore continued to do their own guess-
ing,20 and the psychologists who had ventured forth joined in the general
retreat to the more strongly fortified area of squeaks, squalls and squeals,
21
leaving the lawyers "to their own sadistic pursuits." 22 Outside possibly the
development of the lie detector, the compartmentation has remained fairly
complete. It is time that the legal profession, in particular the students of
evidence, once more turned an eye, preferably a jaundiced one, towards the
activities of other people who are concerned with human behavior.
Currently the field labelled "Communications" seems to offer the
greatest likelihood of ore in paying quantities. Wigmore defined evidence
as "Any knowable fact or group of facts, not a legal or a logical principle,
considered with a viev to its being offered before a legal tribunal for the
purpose of producing a persuasion, positive or negative, on the part of the
tribunal as to the truth of a proposition, not of law or of logic, on which
the determination of the tribunal is to be asked." 23 ] xcept for a rather
spendthrift attitude toward words, this falls neatly within the definition of
communications as "the process by which an individual or group transmits
cues, predominantly verbal, to modify the behavior of another individual
or group."
24
While such things as mathematical theories of information presently
have no apparent significance for our purposes, the mere fact that they are
capable of sustained and serious investigation produces some enlargement
of horizon.2 5 Statistical approaches to verbal behavior attack frontally the
20. Limitations of space preclude adequate reference to the magnificent effort of
Hutchins and Slesinger to evaluate selected rules of evidence in the light of what was
reasonably verifiable in psychology. By singling out particular trees they failed to
examine the structure of the forest as a whole. Where they succeeded was in pointing
out the needlessness of continuing to make guesses wholly in a vacuum of our own
making. These things take time. Hutchins, The Law and the Psychologists, 16 YALE
REV. 678 (1927) ; Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-
Memory, 41 HARV. L. REV. 860 (1928) id., The Competency of Witnesses, 37 YALE
L.J. 1017 (1928); id., Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 CoL. L. Rav. 432 (1928); id.,
State of Mind in Issue, 29 COL. L. REv. 147 (1929) ; id., Family Relations, 13 MINN.
L. REv. 675 (1929) ; id., State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283 (1929) ; id.,
Consciouscss of Guilt, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 725 (1929).
21. Some fought a sturdy rearguard action. Allport, for example, expresses concern
that "man's moral sense is not able to assimilate his technology" and rejects the counsel
of patience in view of the scarcity of scientific findings. "Addiction to machines, rats
or infants leads us to overplay those features of human behavior that are peripheral,
signal-oriented, or genetic. Correspondingly it causes us to underplay those features
that are central, future-oriented, and symbolic." Scientific Models and Human Morals,
54 PsYcH. REv. 182 (1947).
22. HOGBEN, FRO-M CA vE PAINTING TO Comic STRIP 137 (1949).
23. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDEN E § 1 (3d ed. 1940).
24. Hovland, Psychology of the Communication Process, in COa1arUNICATIONS IN
MODERN SOCIErY 59 (Schramm ed. 1948).




problems arising from the unfortunate fact that "we still have very little
bookkeeping in cultural maiters. ' ' 26 More immediately, the analyses of the
stages of communication which have been evolved offer striking parallels
and differences when compared with the rules of evidence. The problem
of placing the trier in possession of the eVent confronts the law implacably
as soon as the making of decisions is removed from the hands of a neighbor-
hood committee of eye-witnesses. 27 The rules of evidence represent the most
careful attempt to control the processes of communication to be found outside
a laboratory. They should benefit from some comparison with communica-
tions as dealt with in the laboratory.
The problem revolves about the experiences of the senses: vision, hear-
ing, smell, taste and touch, all recognized at least since the time of Aristotle,
plus perhaps a refinement of the skin senses (cold, warmth, pain, pressure),
muscle sense (kinesthesis), static sense (equilibrium) and organic sensitivity.
While the same sense through which the experience was received may be
available for its transmission by similar exposure of the receiver, ordinary
procedures both in communication generally and in evidence rely chiefly
on hearing and vision. This involves a complex chain of happenings.
A simplification of the analysis put forward by students of communica-
tion,28 with some amplification due to the specialized character of the evidence
problem, suggests the following sequence: (1) the occurrence of an event;
(2) resulting stimulation of W, the witness; (3) internal reactions and
preverbal tensions in W; (4) speech by W in the form of testimony; (5)
stimulation of T, the trier, by the sound and light waves thus produced;
(6) internal reactions and preverbal tensions in T; and (7) a final external
reaction of T in the form of a decision.
29
I. THE EvENT
Contrary to the controlled laboratory experiment, the occurrence of
the event20 around which the evidentiary process centers is uncontrolled.
26. Lazarsfeld, as quoted in MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 97 (1951).
27. By the opening of the 1600's juries ordinarily depended on evidence given in
open court as their chief source of information and before the middle 1700's were, in
theory at least, obliged to rely upon it as the sole source. Morgan, Some Observations
Concerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 145, 157 (1940).
28. Johnson, Speech and Personality, in THE COIMUNICATION OF IDEAs 53, 56
(Bryson ed. 1948).
29. "The diagram provides a convenient organizing scheme for dealing in an
orderly manner with an exceedingly complex pattern of events. By breaking the pattern
down into a series of stages it becomes possible to examine the functions and possible
disorders at each stage, as well as the conditions importantly related to these functions
and disorders." Ibid.
30. The word "event" is used loosely in order to avoid over-preoccupation with
"stimulus" or some equivalent phrase of psychology. In the laboratory the event may
be a story read or heard, a picture, a scene enacted or the like, with exactness of
control. Laboratory conditions, moreover, do not commonly involve problems of
[ VOL,. 5
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Whether the particular event is one which may properly be communicated
to the trier depends upon considerations of relevance and value judgments
beyond the scope of this inquiry. Assuming that the original event is properly
communicable to the trier, attention will be focused on the ways and means
by which this is accomplished and controlled.
II. STIMULATION OF W BY THE EVENT
In the laboratory the event is independently verifiable, and study may
be concentrated upon the reactions of the witness to it. In evidence, how-
ever, the event is not controlled but controverted. The stimulation of the
witness by the event and his response thereto are relied upon to establish
the event itself. Hence the rules of evidence insist as a basic principle that
the witness be stimulated by the event. Since this condition is usually
satisfied by the assertion of the witness himself, a more accurate statement
would be that the witness must say that he was stimulated by the event or
that other circumstances indicate that such was the case. In formal legal
language the requirement is embodied in the rule against hearsay and in
the rule demanding firsthand knowledge.
Hearsay involves disclosure of the stimulus as being the assertion of a
third person concerning the event, rather than experience of the event
itself. The classic example is the assertion on the stand, "B told me that X
occurred," where the event to be placed before the trier is X and not the
fact that B made the particular statement.31 The firsthand knowledge rule
involves situations in which the witness was not stimulated by the event but
was stimulated by something other than hearsay, ordinarily some related
event plus something that went on in his own head. Illustrative are: testi-
mony by the patient that during an operation the part of the intestine above
the rectum was removed ;32 or testimony that the accused was carrying her
own child toward the river, when the witness was too far distant to identify
the child but. knew she had one.3 3 Wigmore's contention that where the
source of W's information is the assertion of B but W puts it in the form
of an experience of his own it is not hearsay 34 seems to be an over-refinement
credibility. In litigation an exact reproduction of the event may in theory be available
but unaccepted due to the element of credibility.
31. 5 WIGMORE, EVMENc E § 1361 (3d ed. 1940).
32. Smith v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 233 Iowa 340, 7 N.VA.2d 41 (1942). Cf.
Dennis v. McArthur, 23 Wash.2d 33, 158 P.2d 644 (1945), in which the Court was
"not prepared" to say that the witness could not determine that a surgical instrument
was inserted into the uterus rather than into some other orifice opening into the vaginal
canal. Defendant's contention that only a contortionist could do so was rejected.
33. State v. Thorp, 72 N.C. 186 (1875).
34. 2 WIGmom, EVIDENCE § 657 (3d ed. 1940) ; 5 id. § 1361.
1952 ]
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not generally borne out by the cases. 35 Now perception involves complex
receptor and neural processes. 30 In addition to at least one receptor process
(and usually more than one, as we are likely to see and hear at the same
time), perception also involves the activation of symbolic and affective
processes determined largely in terms of past experience. No one who deals
with human behavior can afford to overlook such things as the phi-phenom-
enon which makes movies move, the perceptual constancy which tends to
make us see things as we "know" them, relational discriminations, the effects
of context and past experiences, and the responses to reduce clues which make
typographical errors so difficult to catch.37 The extent of Miinsterberg's
failure in this area was due to his almost perfect misapprehension of the
nature of the judicial process, and not because the area is unimportant to
lawyers.
Only occasionally, however, does the law attempt to deal with perception
in terms more refined than inquiry merely into its apparent presence or
absence. There are the cases holding the testimony of witnesses that they
heard no locomotive bell or whistle to be insufficient to raise an issue in
the face of testimony that the bell was rung and the whistle blown ;38 and
there are cases dealing with the extent to which a witness must have observed
a moving vehicle in order to testify concerning its speed and with the question
whether hearing the vehicle is a sufficient basis for testifying as to speed."
While these instances must be considered exceptional, problems of proof
are by no means confined to the formulation of "rules," and lawyers are
constantly confronted with practical problems of perception. "Attending"
as a "set" involving readiness or lack of readiness to be stimulated is readily
translated into legal experience although not into legal rules.40 Studies of
the relation between verbal habits and perception establish that knowing a
name for the object makes the object easier to recognize.41 Examination
of the preperceptive attitude in terms of receptor adjustments, muscle
35. Treating the problem in terms of stimulation of the witness rather than in
terms of inability to subject the declarant to oath and cross-examination possibly
suggests a new approach to hearsay. Hammelmann, Hearsay Evidence, a Comparison,
67 L.Q. REV. 67 (1951), points out the continental emphasis on lack of perception by
the witness in hearsay situations.
The present approach inevitably entangles us in problems of hearsay which involve
neither hear nor say. Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 192 (1940).
36. MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 400 (2d ed. 1951).
37. Id. at 416.
38. Provenzano v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 357 Ill. 192, 191 N.E. 287 (1934) ; C1.
Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Hillmer, 72 Ill. 235 (1874).
39. 156 A.L.R. 382 (1945).
40. For example, police procedures as to identification of suspects. No matter how
artificial or rigged the show up is, the courts are disposed to deal with it in terms of
weight rather than admissibility. People v. Berne, 384 Ill. 334, 51 N.E.2d 578 (1943);
Lubinski v. State, 180 Md. 1, 22 A.2d 455 (1941). Suggestion is, of course, a further
factor in these cases.
41. MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNIcATION 200 (1951).
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tensions, adjustments of the central nervous system, and correlations between
attending and development of detail4 2 may involve the language of the
psychologist but all fall within the working world of the lawyer.
III. INTERiAL REACTIONS OF W
Preverbal Tensions
Insofar as the exclusionary rules of evidence have indicated interest in
what goes on inside W between the time of his stimulation by the event
and his appearance on the stand, the assumption seems rather generally to
be that W has mentally photographed the event and carries the photograph
around inside him. When he takes the stand, he describes the photograph.
If he never took the photograph, he is in violation of the hearsay or first-
hand knowledge rule. If he did take the photograph but has temporarily
mislaid it, almost any available means may be used to restore it, i.e. refresh
his recollection. If he has lost it entirely but wrote down a description soon
after the event, the description may be used. The continued existence of
the photograph is assumed in the absence of some indication to the contrary.
Thus in effect the legal approach seems to be based upon a psychology of
image formation and retention, probably a considerable oversimplification,
if not downright contrary to the fact.
The psychologists have masked their inability to uncover to any appre-
ciable extent what happens between stimulation or perception and verbaliza-
tion by saying the speaker-about-to-speak experiences "preverbal tensions."
This left-handed confession of ignorance, however, seems preferable to the
unfounded certainty apparent in the legal literature. Some factors do seem
to be demonstrable. Recognizing is easier than recalling.4 3 The reaction
time in association tests is shorter when the stimulus is a word than when
it is a picture.4 4 For reasons previously indicated, similar retinal and other
sensory stimulations will produce different responses in different individuals.45
In the preverbal tension period the relationship between sensory stimulation,
language and "recall" is complex. While eidetic ("photographic") imagery
appears to be not uncommon in children under six, it is rarely present in
adults.46 The rate of forgetting has been studied exhaustively under varying
conditions. Absent the eidetic image, there may be a process of "recoding"
in language the salient features of what has been perceived and a recall of
42. MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 385-97 (2d ed. 1951).
43. Id. at 211.
44. MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 177 (1951).
45. MuNN, PSYCHOLOGY 411 (2d ed. 1951).
46. Id. at 209.
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the language.47 Yet recall is obviously present in animals with no language
at hand for its support, and everyone seems to experience a measure of
image retention although a revisualization often reveals striking inaccuracies
and distortions in the image retained. In any event, it seems worthwhile
to cut loose from the illusion of certainty by admitting that the witness is
going to verbalize "preverbal tensions" and that not nmuch is known about
them.
48
An occasional case has attempted to explore the area in terms other
than standardizations of recall and memory. Judicial attempts, however,
at rule formulation upon the connection between perception and preverbal




The verbal response of the witness on the stand is the result of at
least one further stimulus in addition to the original event, viz., the question
put to him. Experiments demonstrate the great influence which context
exerts upon the choice of the reaction word.50 Word-association and sen-
tence-completion tests also show the existence of groups of words which
function together, leading to ready transitions and becoming likely or
unlikely in similar contexts."1  While Miinsterberg may have taken a
somewhat incautious view of suggestion, 52 the effects of it nevertheless are
readily shown experimentally.53 The general prohibition against asking one's
47. MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COmmUNIcATION 234 (1951). Cf. MORGAN AND MA-
GUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 230 (3d ed. 1951), discussing cases attempt-
ing to deal with the problem whether the witness is "voicing a subjective reconstruction
instead of the mental imprint left by perception of objective happenings". See also
LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 535 (1949).
48. "One can at least be appropriately humble in recognizing the fact that no one
understands very well just how this fateful transformation (of non-verbal goings on
within the nervous system into spoken words) is brought about. But humility need not
be carried to the point of swooning. The fact that does appear to be clear enough, although
it is widely disregarded, is that what we verbalize is not-as the 'practical minded' seem
chronically to take for granted-anything that can be called 'external reality'. . . . It is
• ..preverbal tensions that we verbalize. The crucial significance of this fact is that
basically we always talk about ourselves. . . .What we talk about, then, is a joint
product of reality (regarded as a source of sensory stimulation) and of the conditions
existing within our nervous systems at the time of stimulation". Johnson, Specch and
Personality, in THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS 63 (Bryson ed. 1948).
49. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Humphreys, 285 S.W. 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926),
in which witness failed to form an "opinion" as to speed at the time of perceiving the
train. This case was reversed on further appeal sub nora. Humphries v. Louisiana Ry.
& Irr. Co. of Texas, 291 S.W. 1094 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). Cf. Copithorn v. Boston
& M. R. R., 309 Mass. 363, 35 N.E.2d 254 (1941), in which the witness said he could
"see it now."
50. MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 186 (1951).
51. Id. at 188. As to visual contexts, see MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 409 (2d ed. 1951).
52. MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 175 (1930).
53. Moore, Elements of Error in Testimony, 19 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 447 (1935),
reprinted in 28 ORE. L. Rav. 293 (1949).
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own witness leading questions thus seems to rest on solid ground-until
the time factor is taken into consideration.
The witness is protected 'against suggestion only while on the stand,
seemingly on the assumption either that intervening influences are unimpor-
tant or that he comes untouched from event to court. The former is directly
contrary to the theory upon which leading questions are prohibited. The
latter simply is not so, and the requirement of an offer -of proof to preserve
a ruling on excluded evidence assumes that it is not so. Under the system
of party responsibility for the production of witnesses, no competent attorney
dreams of calling witnesses who have not previously been interviewed. The
preliminary interview affords full play to suggestion and context and evokes
in advance of trial a complete verbalization, the importance of which cannot
be overlooked. When the witness testifies, are his verbalizations at that
time based upon his recall of the event or upon his recall of his former
verbalizations? In any event it seems inevitable that he will attempt to be
consistent with his earlier statement. The trial assumes the character of
a play, and the witness proceeds to "tell his own story" under a type of
questioning which is required by the rules of evidence, even if the good
sense of counsel fails to suggest such a technique, to produce an almost
wholly false impression of spontaneity.5 4 The essential naivete of this
procedure must afford some amusement to any experimental scientist. 55
IV. THE RESPONSE OF THE WITNESS
The response of the witness acts in turn as a stimulus upon the trier,
and hence, with a view to controlling the response of the trier, certain
controls are exercised over the response of the witness. The question of
what the witness may communicate has been disposed of, but there remains
to be considered the question of how he is to communicate.
It should be borne in mind that anything a person says is about
himself. "What we talk about, then, is a joint product of reality (regarded
as a source of sensory stimulation) and the conditions existing within our
nervous systems at the time of stimulation." 6 "Confusing that which is
54. The arguments in favor of a natural narrative by the witness in lieu of question
and answer thus seem devoid of substantial content, except perhaps for some saving of
time. Trying Lawsuits without Yapping, 19 J. A-m. JUD. Socy 155 (1935) ; Ladd,
Credibility Tests--Current Trends, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 166, 168 (1940) ; 3 WiGmomE,
EvIDENCE § 766 (3d ed. 1940). Of course the narrative form renders it impossible to
make the rules operate on an exclusionary basis.
55. Cross-examination may in some measure serve to disclose the influences of
suggestion and context, but only in their most obvious aspects, No one know the extent
to which cases are decided by getting first to even the most honest witness.




inside our skins with that which is outside" 7 is called projection. It is a
lack of "to-me-ness" 5 in dealing with the "real" world. "Unconscious
projection would appear to be a mechanism fundamental in the development
of delusional states, hysterical paralysis, fatigue and other symptoms, as
well as prejudices of various kinds."'
Although the semanticists and psychologists frown upon projection as
an indication of immaturity or instability, the rules of evidence not only
tolerate but rather encourage it. The -witness reasonably well supplied
with "to-me-ness" is headed for trouble on the stand, and the books are
full of cases involving such prefatory statements as "It seems to me," "I
believe," or "My impression is,"0 due to their ambiguity.
Language itself involves many problems. Plato's friend Cratylus became
so doubtful about the actualities of communication by means of words that
he gave up words in favor of pointing. Words, of course, are symbols, and
meaning is pretty much a personal thing.' When a child says bow-wow,
does it mean the dog or the bark ?62 No necessary connection exists between
the symbol and the thing symbolized.33 Dictionaries do not contain meanings
but equivalent verbalizations; they send us on long tours of other words.
4
Meaning to the speaker is what makes him say it-to the hearer the way
it stimulates him. Ogden and Richards' famous triangle of meaning contains
a thought at the apex, a symbol at the end of one leg and a referent at
the end of the other leg. The dotted line connecting the ends of the two
legs and completing the triangle is "stands for."' 5 In any event, even though
semantics "can be turned to very queer ends by people who already had
a gleam in their eye before they met it,"' 6 the objective is clear: to produce
57. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN AcTIoN 104 (1948).
58. JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 56, at 72.
59. Id. at 73.
60. This invites the troublesome kind of exploration mentioned in note 47, supra.
MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 172 (1951), says these phrases are "comments
about, or responses to, the verbal behavior which is to follow."
61. "What we call the meaning of an object, situation, or event'is in most instances
dependent upon how it has stimulated us in the past, the general context in which tils
stimulation occurred, and how we reacted to it." AuNN, PsYCIOLOGY 410 (2d ed. 1951).
See also OGDEN AND RICHARDs, THE MEANING OF MEANING 52, 55, 57 (3d ed. 1930).
62. WALPOLE, SEMANTICS 39 (1941).
63. "Just as men can wear yachting costumes without ever having been near a
yacht, so they can make the noise 'I'm hungry,' without being hungry." HAYAKAWA,
LANGUAGE IN ACTION 22 (1948).
64. "When scholars say 'chien' means 'dog', they should say that 'chien' and 'dog'
both mean the same." OGDEN AND RIcHARDs, THE MEANING OF MEANING 91 (3d ed.
1930). See also MILLER, LANGUAGE AND CO-MtUNICATION 111, 112 (1951) ; Richards'
introduction to WALPOLE, SEMANTICS 14 (1941).
65. OGDEN AND RICHARDS, Op. cit. supra note 64, at 11. An interesting treatment
of the triangle of meaning within the framework of evidence is found in KING AND
PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS C. 1 (1942). See also WALPOLE, SEMANTICS
81 (1941), for a poor man's version of Ogden and Richards.
66. Richards' introduction to WALPOLE, SEMANTICS 16 (1941).
[ VOL,. 5
PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATING
in the trier a reaction which bears the greatest possible similarity to the
reaction produced in the witness by the event.
In everyday life, meaning is a two-way street, involving speaker and
listener and the total backgrounds of each. In common conversation the
possibility is always present that failure to "understand" may become
apparent and the opportunity for clarification thereby be afforded.67 Evi-
dence, on the contrary, offers a one-way street. While on occasion a juror
may screw up his courage to the point of requesting further enlightenment,
ideas of decorum and maintenance of the integrity of the judicial process
seem to preclude asking the trier what impression he has received from a
statement, exhibit or demonstration.6 s Thus while sound practice often
indicates the necessity of considerable exploration and amplification of
meaning during direct examination, and cross-examination affords the
adversary further opportunity therefor, meaning is limited to the witness'
side of meaning. The reaction of trier to the symbols employed remains
a dark jungle, except insofar as some very casual exploration of his back-
ground may have been made upon the voir dire examination. Meaning from
the viewpoint of the trier is revealed, if at all, only in the decision. Thus
the problem of meaning assumes proportions in the judicial process which
are uncommonly troublesome, and the effort to solve the problem in some
measure by rules is to be expected.
The levels of abstraction constitute one of the most important aspects
of language. What is associated now with one thing and again with another
tends to become dissociated from either and to become an object of abstract
contemplation. 9 In ordinary communication a great deal of semantic diffi-
culty arises from a "factually unwarranted degree of categorical thinking,"70
i.e., identification.
"The unreflective use of . . .class words makes automatically for identification,
for overgeneralization and the relative disregard of individual differences and specific
data. Discussions carried on in terms of such words as 'Democrats' and 'Republicans',
'Communists,' and 'capitalists', 'the Russian', 'the Englishman', 'the underprivileged',
'the consumer', etc., tend, unless conducted with extraordinary semantic consciousness
and care in qualification, to degenerate into almost meaningless manipulation of vacuous
verbal forms."'
67. "A language must contain a certain amount of redundancy if it is to be a
reliable means of communication." MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 104 (1951).
68. People v. White, 365 Ill. 499, 6 N.E.2d 1015 (1937), a case involving a disputed
signature, allegedly made by retracing a carbon copy with ink. The jurors examined
the signature by using a microscope under the supervision of a handwriting expert who
asked each juror iii turn whether he could see the black flecks, receiving affirmative
answers. This, the court said, was improper.
69. MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 245 (2d ed. 1951).





Korzybski suggested adding index numbers to terms, as cowl, cow2
and cows, so that, while the common classificatory term reveals what the
individuals have in common, the index numbers serve as a reminder of
characteristics not possessed in common. 72 Word association tests reveal
that "dog" often suggests "animal" but "animal" does not often suggest
"dog.",7 3
The general insistence in evidence cases that the higher levels of
abstraction be reserved to judges and politicians and that witnesses proceed
upon the lowest practicable level of abstraction is, therefore, sound. The
trier will encounter abstraction enough when he attempts to formulate a
decision. The wording of the usual objection to too high a level abstraction
by the witness, viz., that he is expressing an "opinion" or a "conclusion",
has had some tendency to obscure the whole problem. Considerable sym-
pathetic attention has been bestowed upon the witness who has climbed too
high on the ladder of abstraction, has been admonished to "state the facts,"
and has had his mouth effectively closed. The apparent lack of judicial
insight in a fairly large number of cases leads to insistence that the "rule
against opinions" be liberalized. The likely result would seem to be to
deprive the trier of valuable assistance and to return to the earlier practice
of using oath helpers, somewhat in the fashion of character witnesses in
criminal trials today.
Despite the 600,000 words recognized in English, language is a poor
thing at best.
"Tens of thousands of years have elapsed since we shed our tails, but we are still
communicating with a medium developed to meet the needs of arboreal man."'
"The language or languages available to us are such that they tend to make for
oversimplification and overgeneralization. Reality-that is, the sources of sensory
stimulation-is, so far as we know, decidedly process-like, highly dynamic, everchang-
ing. Our language, on the other hand, is by comparison quite static and relatively
inflexible. . . . The basic fact is that, at best, there are far more things to speak
about than there are words with which to speak about them."7
"What a speaker eventually says can hardly be anything but a far cry from the
supposedly relevant first order facts .......
Consequently it is not surprising that witnesses at times encounter
difficulty in verbalizing at the required low "factual" level. The constantly
changing relationship between two moving vehicles involves a complex
72. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN AcrioN 121 (1948); KoRzyBsicr, SCIENCE AND
SANITY cc. 24-26 (2d ed. 1941). Abstractness in art, too, receives its share of criticism
for failure to communicate.
73. MILLER, LANGUAGE AND CoMMUNIcATIoN 184 (1951).
74. OGDEN AND RICHARDS, TnE MEANING OF MEANING 26 (3d ed. 1930).
75. Johnson, Speech and Personality, in THE CO-MmUNICATION OF IDEAS 66 (Bryson
ed. 1948).
76. Id. at 67.
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problem of relative motion of the type solved in naval circles by the
maneuvering board or electronic calculators. The witness is driven to saying,
"If he hadn't of turned out, he would of hit the child on the tricycle."
Testimony in favor of sanity involves the use of an abstraction to avoid
the impossible task of describing the details of a lifetime of normality.
Emotions, particularly complex ones, often are susceptible of description
only in terms of situations supposed to cause them37 Yet in these and
related situations the answers evolved by the courts generally are more
in accord with the practical necessities than are those suggested by their
critics.
V. STIMULATION OF TRIER
If we were concerned only with the response of the witness as such,
no effort to control the response would be indicated. The response of the
witness, however, is without intrinsic significance in the judicial process
and acquires importance only by 'virtue of the fact that it in turn stimulates
the trier. If the experience to which the trier is subjected is really pur-
poseful, it is as an aspect of the broad process of learning, and all the
senses contribute to learning. Hence the more sensory perceptions brought
into operation, the more effective the learning process will be, and this
receives rather extensive recognition in the rules of evidence. Obviously
vision will run a close heat with hearing in any race for preference, although
occasionally smell or some other sense will enter in.
78
Evidence affords great latitude for the use of visual aids. The range
of admissible exhibits includes relevant physical objects, models, maps,
diagrams, photographs, moving pictures, X-rays, and documents generally.
Their effectiveness is recognized in the profession. Demonstrations and
reinactments are received with caution, although considerable discretion is
accorded the trial judge. In at least one instance, that of documents, pref-
erence for the visual over the oral finds expression in the best evidence rule.
A conflict between preferences for visual and oral stimuli occurs in
the case of evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness. A strong
insistence is found that the witness, if possible, appear in person. For
example, depositions and testimony given in a former trial of the case are
inadmissible in the absence of a showing of unavailability of" the witness,
and the accused in a criminal prosecution has the right to be confronted at
the trial by the witnesses against him. The result is to expose the trier
77. MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMIUNICATION 170 (1951).
78. Trier, as well as witness, has a problem of recall. As to the usual superior
recall of visual over auditory observation, see Moore, Elements of Error in Testimony,
19 J. APPLIED PsYcH. 147 (1935), reprinted in 28 ORE. L. REv. 293 (1949).
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to the stimulation of light waves by way of observing the appearance and
demeanor of the witness as well as to the stimulation of the sound waves
created by vocalization. Visual stimulation is not, however, carried to the
fullest possible measure, since testimony is ordinarily not reduced to writing
for the perusal of the trier, especially when he is a jury, and depositions
are read to the jury rather than taken to the jury room. There is even a
rather definite bias against the taking of notes by members of the jury,
although perhaps the general rule has been to leave the matter within the
discretion of the trial judge."! Views of the locus of an occurrence or of
property being condemned are likewise left pretty much to the trial judge,
occasionally to be considered as "evidence" but more often only for the
purpose of helping the trier to "understand and apply the evidence."8 0
This preference for the physical presence of the witness also rests upon
the assumption that the trier, whether an experienced judge or a random
collection of jurors, can evaluate credibility by observing demeanor and
appearance. The court of review is extremely reluctant to disturb trial level
determinations of credibility. "It only reads the evidence and rehears the
counsel. Neither is it a reseeing Court." 8' In other words, every man is
his own lie detector. No scientific basis for this assumption has ever been
demonstrated, and experimental results indicate that on the contrary there
is none.8 2 The commonly recognized symbolic aspects of emotion are highly
conventionalized in some instances, as the Chinese are said to indicate surprise
by sticking out the tongue, and these things are easily simulated. "Anything
in the way of 'spiritual influence', 'value', or the intangibles of personality
that Mr. A may succeed in conveying to Mr. B is to be described ultimately
by the physicist conversant with optics and acoustics."8 3 Nevertheless, the
courts are not yet prepared to accept the lie detector, which takes into account
symptoms of emoti6nal disturbance subject to far more accurate observation
79. BuscH, LAW AND TAcTiCs IN JuRY RuAs 1073 (1949). People v. White, 365
Ill. 499, 6 N.E.2d 1015 (1937), held it error to permit the jury, upon retiring, to use a
magnifying glass to examine an alleged forgery. Other cases have held this analogous
to the use of a pair of spectacles. Busca, op. cit. supra at 1080.
80. The reluctance to permit views, whether of real estate or of a bastard child for
the purpose of determining resemblance to the putative father, to be considered as
"evidence" probably arises from the impossibility of incorporating the object into the
record on appeal. The difficulties of trial court supervision over juries and of appellate
court supervision over trial courts are enhanced by the presence of this uncontrolled
variable.
81. Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home, [1935] A.C. 243, 249.
82. Eliasberg points out the unreliability of expressive movements as a basis for
evaluating credibility in Forensic Psychology, 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 349 (1946). Munn
dsecribes experiments demonstrating the inability of observers to agree on the nature
of emotions manifested, without knowing the nature of the stimuli which caused them.
PsYcHoLoGY 331 (2d ed. 1951).




and measurement s4 although when the crudity of judicial method is re-
vealed in its unattractive nakedness, the courts hasten to cover the indecent
exposure.8, As long as credibility continues to be evaluated upon the present
basis, the jury will continue to serve a most useful function by performing
for courts what the judges themselves cannot do without the appearance
of absurdity and consequent damage to the prestige of judicial institutions.
Presently not much is discernible in the way of a trend towards calling
in the psychologist and the psychiatrist to assist with the problem of
credibility. Eventually, free association tests,86 psychiatric diagnosis, 7 and
the so-called truth drugs8s may, along with the lie detector technique, attain
recognition, but acceptance is slow. Perhaps the situation is one of scientific
unreadiness rather than judicial hesitancy.89 Robinson naively expressed
disappointment that "Psychologists have not been called in any numbers
to assess the credibility of witnesses," yet on the following page admitted,
"If we go back over the entire history of psychology we are struck by the
purely ephemeral character of its schools of thought."9 0 After all, the
decisions of courts are not tucked away in scientific journals. Abdication
in favor of the psychologists and psychiatrists is not advocated, but an
increased awareness of developments and methodology in their fields is
indispensable to an intelligent solution of the credibility problem.
84. INDAu, LIE DErECrION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1942); Smallwood, Lie
Dectectors, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 535 (1944).
85. In Querica v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 Sup. Ct. 698, 77 L. Ed. 1321
(1933), the trial judge told the jury: "And now I am going to tell you what I think of
the defendant's testimony. You may have noticed, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that
he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is rather a curious thing, but that is almost
always an indication of lying. Why it should be so we don't know, but that is the fact."
The giving of the instruction was held erroneous. As Judge Frank points out, it would
have been all right for the jury to have assessed credibility on this basis but it should not
openly have been talked about. Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp.,
175 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1949). It is interesting to note, however, that increased activity of
the sweat glands accompanies emotional upset, resulting in changes in the electrical
resistance of the skin which can be measured by an adaptation of the Wheatstone bridge.
MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 348 (2d ed. 1951). The galvanic skin response is one of the responses
recorded by the lie detector.
86. MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 372 (2d ed. 1951).
87. Machtinger, Psychiatric Testimony for the Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex
Cases, 39 J. CUim. L. 750 (1949). The use of psychiatric impeaching testimony in
the second Hiss case aroused great interest. The reaction in legal circles was generally
not unfavorable. Jones, Admission of Psychiatric Testimony in Alger Hiss Trial, 11
A".. LAW. 212 (1950); Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of Mentally Abnormal Witness,
59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950); cf. Note, 30 NuB. L. Rlv. 513 (1951). Comment by the
psychiatrists, however, was unfavorable. Roche, Truth Telling, Psychiatric Expert
Testimony and Impeachment of W~itnesses, 22 PA. B. A. Q. 140 (1951). See also
Eliasberg, Forensic Psychology, 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 349 (1946).
88. Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. OF CHI. L. Rxv. 601
(1947).
89. Note, Status of Lie Detector Evidence in California, 39 CALIF. L. Riv. 439
(1951) ; Roche, supra note 87; Despres, supra note 88.
90. ROBINsoN, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 98, 99 (1935).
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Any account of the stimuli to which trier is exposed would be patently
incomplete in the absence of at least passing reference to the final arguments
of counsel and the instructions by the court. They lie outside the conven-
tional scope of the subject of evidence, and hence beyond the confines of
this discussion. Nevertheless, the influences of both upon the decision
making process present additional fields for further critical appraisal, since
they too constitute variables bearing upon the final result. Certainly the
effectiveness of the "limiting" instruction, whereby the jury are cautioned
against improper application of evidence admissible for one purpose but not
for another, directly concerns the present inquiry.
VI. TRIER'S RESPONSE
The response of the trier in the form of a verdict or judgment is
another aspect of the decision making process which lies outside the con-
ventional areas of evidence. Nevertheless, it is the end product of the
entire process, and an examination of any aspect of communications would
scarcely be complete without some regard to the reaction of the listener.0 '
Current scientific thinking, which requires the definition of concepts in
terms of the operations producing them, 92 seems also to require that the
validity of the method be examined in the light of the results obtained.
This the law rather carefully guards against.
A verdict is usually as impenetrable as a billiard ball. If it falls within
the factual framework of the evidence and the legal framework of the
instructions, ordinarily it is impervious to attack. Consequently a wholly
preposterous view of the facts may combine with a complete misapprehension
of the applicable law to produce a perfectly good verdict. Jurors may not
be questioned as to their decision or manner of reaching it, other than the
formal poll "Is this your verdict?" Nor may the testimony of a juror
ordinarily be received to impeach the verdict.0 3 A judge giving instructions
is like a general giving orders without ever knowing whether they are
carried out. 4 The reversal of a decision for error in an instruction thus
confers an independent power upon words, such as is found in many of
the old folk tales.95
91. "But he cannot check that his message got across if his recipient never repeats
it or if it is repeated where he cannot hear it. The secondary information, that the
recipient knows the item, must somehow return to the original talker." MILLER,
LANGUAGE AND COMmUNIcATION 252 (1951).
92. See note 7 supra.
93. See Hutchinson v. Laughlin, 102 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio App. 1951), a medical
malpractice case, in which the foreman of the jury apparently voted for defendant on
the ground that from his own knowledge of astrology the operation was undertaken at
a time which ordained failure, since the moon was in the sign ruling that part of the
body. The verdict was allowed to stand.




While the use of special verdicts and special interrogatories may result
in some penetration below the surface of jury decisions, the enlightenment
is more apparent than real. About the same may be said of requiring findings
of fact by judges trying cases without a jury.
An evaluation of the decision in the light of the evidence and the
conduct of the trial once more involves the making of certain assumptions
about human behavior. Here again the reasonable man concept is en-
countered. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, a judge trying a
case without a jury is presumed to have disregarded evidence improperly
admitted. No such presumption prevails as to juries. In passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular verdict, courts frankly
phrase their decisions in terms of whether reasonable men could so find in
view of the evidence. This assumes that there is such a thing as a reasonable
man, in fact at least twelve of him, and that the judge has some inner
sources for ascertaining how he reacts to all kinds of situations. This is, of
course, done wholly without regard to significant studies of relations within
groups. G Moreover, there is practically no effort at inner exploration of
individual jurors, other than the casual investigation of the voir dire exam-
ination which is concerned mainly with interests which might affect the
decision, although attitudes seem equally significant.
97
CONCLUSION
The whip-socket is not going to be removed from Evidence all at once.
Common sense must continue to be our guide in these matters, but what
is good common sense varies with the times. It involves acquaintance with
what is developing in other areas. Today it certainly involves a willingness
to admit that what cannot be demonstrated scientifically is always at least
open to argument. In Evidence the need is very great for an increased use
of inverted commas to indicate a transitional stage in our thinking between
the extremes of absolute certainty and complete abandoment.98 Clemenceau
said that war was too important to be left to the generals. The objective
study of human behavior is too important to be left to the psychologists.
96. FESTINGER et al., THEORY AND EXPERIMENT IN SOCILU COaraMUNICATION C. 1
(1950).
97. "The vast bulk of responses which can be elicited are evoked on the basis of
prior learning." Hovland, Psychology of the Communication Process, in COMUNICA-
TIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY 59 (Schramm ed. 1948).
"We are more likely to have attitudes and do nothing about them than we are to
have interests and do nothing about them. Nevertheless, when we are called upon to
make decisions, to act, and to express opinions, our attitudes determine the outcome just
as strongly as do our interests." MuNN, PSYCHOLOGY 300 (2d ed. 1951).
"Habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent.
• . . You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of
thought, the prejudices, the ways of the 'shop', in a word, from which the man can by
and by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall in a new set of folds." 1
JAmEs, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 121 (1890). See also note 93 supra.
98. I am unable to locate the originator of this phraseology.
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